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A complex regulatory package implementing a new support scheme for renewable 
electricity has recently been adopted in Spain as a response to escalating support costs, 
which have mostly been related to solar PV promotion. The new remuneration scheme 
can be considered retroactive and negatively affects the profitability of existing solar 
PV plants. The aim of this paper is to analyse the implications of the new retroactive 
regulation on the profitability of those plants in Spain. Using real data from a very 
common PV plant, the results show that, indeed, the new support scheme has a 
considerable impact on the cash-flows of those plants. However, our simulations also 
show that the degree of reduction in the internal rates of return critically depends on 
several factors, assumptions and scenarios. 
 







A recent regulatory package has led to the implementation of a new scheme for 
the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in Spain, which 
has involved a substantial rupture with the pre-existing system. A main feature of the 
new scheme, which was passed in 2014, is its retroactivity, i.e., it applies to existing 
plants which were subject to the previous regulation (either the Royal Decree (RD) 
661/2007 in 2007 or the RD 1578/2008 in 2008). Those plants had already suffered 
retroactive cuts due to cost-containment measures adopted between 2010 and 2013 (see 
[1] for details). The aim of this paper is to analyse the implications of the new 
retroactive regulation on the profitability of solar PV plants in Spain. 
Indeed, the promotion of RES-E in Spain has received a lot of attention in the 
past, given the significant increase in the deployment of RES-E in general and solar PV 
in particular, which was mostly a result of stable and generous feed-in regulations. 
Some articles are devoted to the analysis of the public promotion of RES-E in Spain ([2] 
[3] [4] [5] [6] [7]), whereas others have specifically focused on solar PV ([8] [9] [10] 
[11] [12]). 
Spain has also received worldwide attention due to the implementation of the 
aforementioned measures to contain the costs associated to this deployment between 
2010 and 2013. The government was concerned about the substantial increase of RES-E 
support costs (see, e.g., the Special Report of the IPCC on Renewable Energy, [13]). 
This increase in support costs, which triggered the implementation of cost-containment 
measures, was mostly due to solar PV promotion, with support costs escalating more 
than fifteen-fold from 215 M€ in 2007 to 3267 M€ in 2013. These cost-containment 
measures included a cap on the electricity generation being eligible for support (Royal 
Decree Law 14/2010), a grid access charge (Royal Decree Law 14/2010 and RD 
1544/2011), a generation charge (Law 15/2012), a shortening of the remuneration 
period (Royal Decree 1565/2010 and RDL 14/2010) and the updating of tariffs below 
the consumer price index (Royal Decree Law 2/2013). Their impact on solar PV plants 
has been analysed by several authors (e.g. [14] [15] [1]). However, to our best 
knowledge, the economic impact of the new regulation has not been researched. This 
paper tries to cover this gap in the literature. 
The retroactive cuts of the new regulation in Spain can also be set in the context 
of retrospective measures directly attacking the stability and viability of existing PV 
installations in several EU countries in recent years (see, e.g., [16]). 
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Accordingly, this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a 
brief background and details of the new regulation for RES-E support in general and 
solar PV in particular. Section 3 discusses the methodology, data and main assumptions 
which have been used to analyse the economic impact of the new regulation on the 
profitability of a solar PV plant. This analysis is carried out in section 4. The paper 
closes with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The new renewable energy promotion scheme in Spain. 
 
2.1. The motivation for the new regulation. 
The RES-E support scheme in Spain has been based on feed-in tariffs (FITs) and 
feed-in premiums (FIPs) since 1998, with some rather minor reforms of the whole 
scheme taking place in 2004 and 2007. As it is well known, FITs provide total payments 
per kWh of electricity of renewable origin, whereas a payment per kWh on top of the 
electricity wholesale-market price is granted under FIPs.  
Until 2007, the trends of solar PV capacity deployment, triggered by the feed-in 
regulations were gradual, from less than 1MW in 1999 to 690 MW in 2007 and 3398 in 
2008. However, a substantial increase was experienced between 2007 and 2008, partly 
triggered by the 2007 FIT reform (developed by royal decree RD 661/2007). From mid-
2007 to September 2008, the Spanish PV sector experienced an investment boom, 
which led to a ten-fold increase in solar PV deployment. While this boom was 
circumscribed to the solar PV sector, it led to a substantial increase in RES-E support 
costs (see Table 1)1. A new regulation specifically for solar PV deployment was 
adopted in 2008. It implemented a flexible degression scheme and a capacity cap for 
new plants (RD 1578/2008). In addition to the economic crisis and some characteristics 
of the Spanish electricity market (the so-called tariff deficit, a declining electricity 
demand leading to excess electricity installed capacity and very limited interconnections 
with other countries), the concern of the government about the large increase in these 
support costs led to the implementation of the aforementioned cost-containment 
regulations, which affected all renewable energy technologies2. Furthermore, a 
																																								 																				
1 For an analysis of the factors leading to this boom, see [15] [2]. 
2 For a decade, the revenues (electricity prices for utilities) have been regulated and below the electricity system 
costs. This has led to a “Spanish anomaly”, i.e., to an accumulated “tariff deficit” which at the present time amounts € 
30,000 M (~3% GDP). Recently, the governments have increased electricity bills in order to reduce such deficit. 
Moreover, Spain is virtually an energy island, with limited interconnection or trading with neighboring countries. 
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moratorium on RES-E support was implemented by RDL 1/2012 and entered into force 
on January 2012. Plants installed later would not receive any support. Several 
regulations were approved in 2013 and 2014 (including RD 413/2014 which regulates 
the production of electricity from renewable energy sources [17]) which have put an end 
to this moratorium. 
Table 1 
 
The new scheme for the promotion of renewable electricity is based on four 
pieces of legislation: a Royal Decree Law (RDL 9/20133), a Law (Law 24/20134), the 
Royal Decree 413/2014 and the Ministerial Order IET/1045/2014 [20]. The new 
regulation was mostly driven by the concern of the government about the “financial 
sustainability of the electricity system”. It is mentioned that the (previously) highly 
favorable support scheme as well as the reduction of technology costs led to deployment 
above expectations and made it necessary to correct the regulatory framework (RD 
413/2014, [17 p. 43877]). 
 
2.2. Main concepts in the new regulation. 
The new legislation is based on several main concepts: 
• Reasonable profitability. This is a main concept which is defined by RDL 
9/2013 as a project profitability based on the average yield (pre-tax) of Spanish 
10-year government bonds in the secondary market plus 300 basis points (i.e. 
3%). The “average yield” refers to the average of the yields in the 10 years 
before the entry into force of RDL 9/2013 in July 2013. This profitability may 
be revised every 6 years. According to such calculation, the reasonable 
profitability level was 7.39% at the time the Law 24/2013 was passed 
(December 2013). This concept applies to, both, existing and new installations 
(i.e. it is retroactive). 
• Efficient and well-managed firm. The reasonable profitability level is the one 
which corresponds to an efficient and well-managed firm. RDL 9/2013 states 
that according to European Community jurisprudence, this concept refers to a 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
This fact, along with poor long-term planning, has resulted in the Spanish electricity system having significant excess 
electricity generation capacity [15]. 
3 Royal-Decree Law 9/2013 which adopts urgent measures in order to guarantee the financial stability of the 
electricity system.  
4 Law 24/2013 of the electricity sector. 
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firm which is endowed with the necessary means to develop its activity and 
whose costs are those of a firm with a reasonable benefit. The aim is to ensure 
that the high costs of an inefficient firm are not taken as reference. 
• Plant type and retributive parameters. Each installation, taking into account its 
main features, will be associated to a standard plant or “plant type”. These plant 
types are defined and classified according to their technology, installed capacity 
and age in the Ministerial Order. The so-called reasonable profitability of the 
plant type will then be used to set the remuneration level for the specific plants. 
The most relevant retributive parameters include the remuneration for the initial 
investment of the plant (Rinv), the remuneration for the operation of the plant 
(Ro), the useful regulatory life, the number of minimum and maximum 
generation full-load hours, the functioning threshold, the annual lower and upper 
limits of the market price and the average annual market price5. The expected 
electricity demand levels and the general situation of the economy will be taken 
into account in the setting of these retributive parameters. 
• Existing installations. Existing installations which fell under the previous 
support scheme before July 14th 2013. 
• Regulatory period and revisions. The retributive parameters will be revised 
every six years in order to comply with the reasonable profitability principle. 
The first regulatory period will last from 2013 to 2018. In addition, there will 
also be “semi-regulatory periods” of 3 years. Revisions can also take place after 
each semi-regulatory period but these revisions will only apply to the estimates 
of the revenues of the plant types which are related to the sale of electricity at 
market prices. 
• Useful regulatory life. Once the installation has exceeded its useful regulatory 
life (i.e., 30 years), it will not receive any support (i.e., neither support for 
investment nor operation). These installations may receive the electricity market 
price if they continue to sell their electricity in the market after their useful 
regulatory life has expired. 
• Competitive concurrence scheme. This term is synonymous to “auction”. This 
type of instrument will be used to allocate support to new plants. 
																																								 																				
5 In addition, an incentive for investments (Iinv) can also be provided for “isolated electricity systems in non-
peninsular territories” on an exceptional basis (art.11). 
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2.3. A description of the new remuneration scheme. 
Under Law 24/2013, RES-E plants will receive the market price plus a “specific 
complementary remuneration”. This means that RES-E installations would participate 
in the electricity market and receive the wholesale price of electricity as well as a 
“specific remuneration”, i.e. an additional remuneration which allows these 
technologies to compete on an equal footing with the rest of technologies in the market. 
This specific remuneration will allow these technologies to cover their costs and has 
two elements, the remuneration for investment and the remuneration for the operation of 
the plant: 
• The remuneration for the investment (Rinv) refers to a payment per kW that 
allows installations to recover those investment costs which cannot be recovered 
by the sales of electricity in the market. This payment is received during the 
useful regulatory life of the installation. 
• The specific remuneration for the operation (Ro) refers to a payment per kWh for 
those technologies whose operational costs are above the average wholesale 
electricity price.  
Therefore, the specific remuneration for RES-E plants would be the total revenues 
received by the plant owner (which includes Rinv and Ro) minus the revenues from the 
electricity sold in the wholesale electricity market. Formally, it can be expressed as 
follows: 
 𝑇𝑅! = 𝑝! · 𝑞! + 𝑆𝑅! = 𝑝! · 𝑞! + 𝑅!"# + 𝑅! = 𝑝! · 𝑞! + 𝐼!∗ · 𝑠 + 𝑂!∗ · 𝑞!        [1] 
 
where,  
TRt Total revenues received by a given plant in year t (€). 
pt Annual average wholesale price of electricity (€/kWh). 
qt RES-E sold in the wholesale electricity market (kWh). 
SRt Specific remuneration received by a given plant in year t (€). 
Rinv Remuneration for the investment of the plant (€) 
Ro Remuneration for the operation (€) 𝐼!∗ Unitary remuneration for the investment of a plant type (€/kW)	
s Size (installed capacity) of the plant (kW). 𝑂!∗	 Unitary remuneration for the operation of a plant type (€/kWh).	
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The unitary remuneration for the investment of a plant type (𝐼!∗) is calculated as follows 
𝐼!∗ = 𝜌 · 𝑉!! · 𝑖∗ 1+ 𝑖∗ !1+ 𝑖∗ ! − 1 
where:  
ρ is the adjustment coefficient for the plant type. It refers to the investment costs 
which cannot be recovered by the sale of electricity. It is calculated according to 
regulated criteria which include the net value of the plant and an estimate of the 
flows of revenues and expenditures along its useful regulatory life. 
0
jV  Net value of the plant at the start of the regulatory period (j) for the plant type. 
For new plants, this value equals the initial investment of the plant type. 
i* Interest rate (average yield (pre-tax) of Spanish 10-year government bonds in the 
secondary market plus 300 basis points). 𝑇 Residual regulatory life, e.g., the regulatory life minus the number of years since 
the date of commissioning of the plant until the start of the semi-regulatory 
period. 
 
ρ may have a negative value in some cases which, as indicated in the Report 
18/2013 from the (formerly) National Energy Commission ([21]), is contradictory with 
its complementary character and, thus, with renewable energy deployment. 
Furthermore, such specific remuneration will only be received if the capacity of the 
plant is above a minimum threshold value, which is set annually by the government in a 
Ministerial Order (art. 31.5). The specific value of the specific remuneration for 
investment cannot be anticipated by potential investors, since it depends on the 
parameters defined for each plant type and the length of the useful regulatory life. 
Since the wholesale electricity prices constantly change, an upper and a lower 
threshold have been set on the average annual electricity price in the daily market. If the 
electricity price is above the upper limit, this will lead to payment obligations for 
electricity generators and if the annual electricity price is below the lower limit, then 
generators will receive the corresponding monetary compensation. Both monetary flows 
are called “adjustment values”. The threshold can be revised every three years. 
The scheme could be considered retroactive for existing plants, i.e. for plants 
being deployed before 2012 under the previous support schemes (RD 1578/2008 or RD 
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661/2007). The “rules of the game” for these plants have clearly changed, i.e., they are 
no longer subject to the remuneration conditions of RD 1578/2008 or RD 661/2007, but 
to RD 413/2014. The detrimental impact is particularly strong for solar PV plants, as 
30% of them may have to close ([22]). The government can revise crucial parameters 
influencing the remuneration levels every six years, which represents a main source of 
risk for potential investors. Under the new regulation, investors cannot anticipate which 
will be the support levels after 6 years or even after 3 years regarding the estimates of 
the revenues of plant types related to the sale of electricity at market prices.This is likely 
to lead to higher capital costs, given the high risk premiums which are likely to be 
charged by banks6. 
 
3. Methods. 
The analysis of the impact of the new regulation on the cash-flow and internal 
rate of return (IRR) of solar PV plants in Spain is based on real data of the different 
features of a very common PV plant. The economic flows of the plant for each year of 
the plant lifetime have been simulated with an excel sheet. Then, we have calculated the 
impact of the new regulation taking into account the reduction in support levels that it 
envisages. The support levels (tariffs) and the inflation rate until 2013 are observed 
data. Ranges of possible values for different variables were considered in the sensitivity 
analysis, leading to different IRR values. In particular, since the cash flows need to be 
projected to the future, some assumptions about those variables critically affecting the 
remuneration received by the plant have had to be made. The following subsections 
describe the data on the features of the plant (3.1), general assumptions about the plant 
(3.2) and data and assumptions on key regulatory variables affecting the plant (3.3). 
 
3.1. Data on the features of the reference plant. 
 
The plant used for this analysis (called the “reference plant”) was built in 2008. It 
has 99.33 kW of nominal power and is located in poor agricultural land, 25 kilometers 
away from the city of Lleida in Catalonia (Spain). The owners have another 9 plants 
which add up to 0.9933 MW. All these plants have a similar size and are close to each 
other. Other main features of the plant are: 
																																								 																				
6 For an analysis of the new regulation taking into account different criteria, see [23]. 
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• The plant is subject to RD 661/2007 
• It is located in radiation zone III. 
• The plant occupies 5,700 square meters of land. 
• The land was bought at a market price of € 7,850. 
• The length of the evacuation line is 500 meters. 
• The average number of full load hours in the 2008-2012 period was 2,100 hours, 
with a load factor of 23.9%. Therefore, the plant generates 210,000 kWh/year 
(2100 times 100kW). 
• The peak power of the investor component is 5% above the nominal power of 
the plant. 
• The upfront investment for the 99.33 kW plants amounted to €639,614.31. 
According to the plant’s managers, if this plant had been a turnkey plant, then its 
costs would have been 13% higher. 
• 80% of the initial investment is financed with a loan at an interest rate of 6% 
over 12 years. 
• Annual operation and maintenance (O&M) costs (including insurance costs): € 
3,600. Land tax: € 30 per plant per year. 
• The plant is equipped with arrays with a 2-axis tracking system.  
 
Table 2 provides details on the different cost concepts of the plant. 
Table 2 
 
3.2. General assumptions about the plant. 
The analysis is based on the following key assumptions for the plant: 
• An annual degradation rate of 0.75% has been assumed, i.e., the generation 
capacity of the plant is reduced by 0.75% each year. PV systems are often 
financed based on an assumed 0.5 to 1.0% per year degradation rate [24]. 
According to the studies reviewed in [25] the average degradation rate is 0.7%. 
Therefore, we assume the middle value, 0.75, as done in [26]. 
• A new inverter is purchased every ten years. The inverter for the years 10 and 20 
are entirely financed with a loan at a 6% interest rate. 
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• The costs of the inverters are shown in Table 3. Their value is added to the 




• O&M costs increase by 2% annually. 
• Until 2013, the CPI has been used for the annual updating of the tariffs. We 
assume a 2% CPI after 2013 in the scenario without cost-containment 
measures7. This is in line with the goal of European Central Bank, which aims at 
inflation rates of below but close to 2% in the medium term (see 
www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html). 
• We assume an underlying inflation rate of 1% after 2013. This can be justified 
since we assume a 2% CPI and the average underlying inflation rate in Spain 
was half the CPI between 2010 and 2012.This rate is the one used for the 
updating of the remuneration after 2013, according to RDL 2/2013. 
• A useful life of 30 years for the plant has been assumed. 
• The wholesale electricity price (pool price) for those kWh of electricity 
generation which are above the generation cap and, thus, are not eligible for the 
FITs is calculated as the average electricity price of the daily and intra-daily 
markets. This price is assumed constant since 2013. 
• It is assumed that the residual value of the plant and its components are null.  
• The decommissioning costs and the corporate tax have not been included in the 
calculation.  
 
3.3. Data and assumptions on key regulatory variables affecting the plant. 
• According to RDL14/2010, the remuneration of plants equipped with arrays 
with a 2-axis tracking system is capped to 1,707 full-load hours until 2013. The 
cap is increased to 2,015 full-load hours after 2013. 
• According to RDL 14/2010 and RD 1544/2011, there is a grid access charge of 
0.05 €cents/kWh after 2011. 
																																								 																				
7 Recall that, according to RD661/2007, the tariffs will be annually updated by the CPI minus 25 basic points (0.25%) 
during the first four years and the CPI minus 50 basic points (0.50%) thereafter. 
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• According to Law 15/2012, a generation charge of 7% of total revenues is set. 
• Although we assume that the plant has a useful life of 30 years, the remuneration 
period was set to 28 years in RDL 14/2010. 
• The plant type relevant for out plant is IT-00058 ([23] p. 46474), since ours is a 
plant subject to RD 661/2007, with a capacity higher than 100 kW but lower 
than 2 MW, with arrays with a 2-axis tracking system and in operation since 
2008. 
• According to Order IET/1045/2014 [20], the remuneration levels corresponding 
to the plant typeIT-00058 are the following: 
-For the period between July 14thand December 31st 2013:a remuneration for 
investment (Rinv) of €/kW 318.281 is provided. This amounts to€ 31,614.85 for a 
99.33 kW plant. The remuneration for operation (Ro) amounts to €cents/kWh 
2.0572(IET/1045/2014, [20] p.46516). 
-For the period 2014-2016 
o The remuneration for investment is €/kW 679.372 (67,482.02 € for a 
99.33 kW plant) for each of the considered years. 
o The remuneration for the operation (Ro) for 2014 is €cents/kWh 2.542 
(IET/1045/2014, [20] p.46560), 2.4686 c€/kWh for 2015 and 2.5314 
c€/KWh for 2016 (IET/1045/2014, [20] p.46637). It can be observed that 
the coefficient to obtain Ro *( )tO goes down by 2.8% between 2014 and 
2015 and increases by2.5% in 2016 with respect to the previous year. 
• The Order sets a useful regulatory life of 30 years, with an adjustment 
coefficient of one. For half the year 2013, the maximum number of full-load 
hours in order to receive Ro is 995, the minimum number of hours is 255 and the 
operation threshold is 149 hours (IET/1045/2014  [20], p.46516).For the period 
2014-16, these values on the number of hours are, respectively, 2124, 1274 and 
743 (IET/1045/2014 [20], p.46560). The number of full load-hours for 2014, 
2015 and 2016 in our simulation has been set at 2020, 2005 and 1990 hours, 
taking into account the degradation of the modules. Those numbers of hours are 
below the aforementioned maximum hours set in the IET. 
• As previously mentioned, the new regulation only affects the second half of 
2013. In this period, the number of full-load hours was set at 995, which entails 
98,833 kWh for a 99.33 kW plant. In the first semester of 2013, electricity 
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generation amounted to 103,408 kWh according to our simulation. This 
electricity has been remunerated at €cents/kWh 47.56. Such amount of 
electricity and the corresponding hours are below the 1149 full-load hours which 
have been set for the first half of the year (IET/1045/2014 [20], p. 46753).  
• The simulation for 2014-2016 includes the requirements of the new regulation, 
as well as the revenues due to the sales of electricity in the wholesale market, 
i.e., Rinv (whose value is the same for the three years), in addition to the annual 
value of *tO  (the coefficient to obtain Ro) multiplied by the electricity generation 
simulated plus this electricity generation times the wholesale electricity price 
(daily market). This price is published by the Iberian Electricity Spot Market 
Operator (OMIE). For the second half of 2013, this price was 5.129€cents/kWh 
and is now 4.821 €cents/kWh, 4.952 €cents/kWh and4.975 €cents/kWh for 
2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively. We have assumed a price of 5.308 
€cents/kWh for the years after 2017 (IET/1045/2014 [20], p.46753). 
 
In addition, the following assumptions on key regulatory variables have been made. 
 
• The simulation for the years after 2017 includes the following assumptions: 
o For simplicity, a constant wholesale electricity price has been assumed 
since 2017 until the end of the useful lifetime of the plant.  
o It has been assumed that the value of Rinvis the same between 2017 and 
2019. 
o From 2020 to 2037 it has been assumed that the only investment that has 
to be paid off is the renewal of the inverter and, thus, the amount of Rinv 
is adapted to the amount of the financial costs that this implies8. 
• The calculations have been carried out considering a regulatory life of 30 years 
(as established in RD 413/2014), instead of 28 years. 
 
4. The economic impact of the new regulation on solar PV plants. 
 
																																								 																				
8 This assumption, which can be deemed a pessimistic one, is later relaxed in section 4. 
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This section simulates the impact of the new regulation on the cash-flows and 
profitability (IRR) of the solar PV plant (4.1) and carries out a sensitivity analysis on 
the impact of several factors on its profitability (4.2). 
 
4.1. Simulating the impact of the new regulation on the cash-flow and profitability 
of the solar PV plant. 
According to our calculations, the profitability of a solar PV plant under RD 
661/2007 was relatively high, with IRRs above 11% (Table 4). The impact of the new 
regulation has been calculated with the data and assumptions for the plant mentioned in 
section 3. We have taken into account different factors affecting such profitability, e.g. 
different borrowing levels and whether the plant is turnkey or not. The reference plant is 
financed with a loan of 80% of upfront costs. For the turnkey plant, two cases are 
considered (80% and 100%). In all cases, the interest rate is 6% and the loan is fully 
repaid after 12 years. The new regulation results in lower remuneration flows for solar 
PV plants compared to those established in RD 661/2007, leading to lower cash-flows 
and, thus, substantially lower IRRs, which are in the 0.31% to 3.28% range. The lower 
extreme of the range refers to a turnkey plant with a loan of 100% of upfront costs. But 
the lowest IRR in RD 661/2007 was also for the turnkey plant with a 100% borrowing 
level. Whether the plant is turnkey or not seems to be more influential on the reduction 




The following two figures show the evolution of the cash flows over the period 
in the “best” (a reference plant with 80% borrowing) and the “worst” (a turnkey plant 
with a 100% borrowing level) cases (Figures 1 and 2, respectively). The solid line in 
both figures represents the cash flows under RD 661/2007. The discontinuous lines 
indicate the cash flows for the same plant under the cost-containment measures in 2010-
2013 and the new regulation (for a turnkey plant). The line with a parallel lay-out in 
Figure 1 indicates the cash flows for a non-turnkey plant under the cost-containment 







Both figures show that the net cash flows are substantially reduced from the start 
of the period (and, especially, since 2011) with respect to those envisaged in RD 
661/2007, due to the cost-containment measures adopted in 2010-2013. In the case of 
the turnkey plant, the situation is even worse until 2020 since the cash flows are almost 
null in some years. After 2019, the debt of the plant is cancelled but the support for 
investment (Rinv) is no longer received. One effect partly offsets the other and, thus, the 
cash flows are still low after 2020, and much lower than in RD 661/2007.A turnkey 
plant with a 100% borrowing level results in negative cash flows from 2011 to 2020. 
Again, the loan is fully repaid in 2020, but this positive effect on the cash flow is partly 
offset by the lack of support for investment after that year. Therefore, the cash flows 
after 2020 are positive but very low, leading to very low IRRs for the whole period 
(Table 4). 
The detrimental effects of the new regulation on the profitability of the plant 
adds to the negative impacts of the cost-containment measures adopted between 2010 
and 2013. The following figure (Figure 3) shows that the effects of the new regulation 
are even more detrimental for the profitability of the plant than those related to those 
cost-containment measures. While the cost-containment measures reduced the IRR by a 
couple of percentage points in both a reference plant with a loan of 80% for the initial 
investment (solid line) and in the worst of cases, i.e., a turnkey plant with a loan of 
100% of the initial investment (discontinuous line), the new regulation sinks the IRR by 
six additional percentage points. This is mostly due to the virtual elimination of support 
for investment after 2020 (𝑅!"#).9Therefore, the combined impact of the cost-





4.2. Sensitivity analysis on the impact of several factors on the profitability of the 
plant. 
																																								 																				
9The situation in the real world could be even worse because the simulation does not include the opportunity costs of 
the funds provided to cover the negative cash flows. 
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Several factors affect the reduction in the profitability of the plant as a result of 
the new regulation. These factors include different borrowing levels, changes in the 
initial investment, whether the plant is turnkey or not and continuation of support after 
2019.Therefore, we have carried out simulations to identify the impact of the new 
regulation on the IRRs in different scenarios, e.g., under different values for those 




4.2.1. Impact of different borrowing levels.  
 
Borrowing levels refer to the percentage of the initial investment which is 
financed by a loan. The impact of different borrowing levels on the IRR of the plant has 
been calculated (40%, 60%, 80% and 100%). Obviously, greater percentages entail 
lower IRRs because the financial expenditures associated to the loan are greater. In 
some cases the IRR can vary by as much as 3% between the 40% and 100% borrowing 
levels. In fact, this factor seems to amplify the negative influence of the new regulation. 
For example, the difference in the IRR between the 40% and 100% cases in the RD 
661/2007 is 1.67% (9.10% to 10.77%), whereas this difference is wider in the new 
regulation (2.79%, from 2.35% to 5.14%)10 
 
4.2.2. Impacts of changes in the initial investment. 
 
Since solar PV is a capital-intensive technology, the amount of the initial, 
upfront investment is a main factor affecting the profitability of the plant. Higher levels 
of initial investment significantly reduce the IRR. The influence of this variable on the 
impact of the new regulation is considerable. We consider four cases (increases of 20% 
and 10% and reductions of 20% and 10% with respect to the base case of €639,614). 
This factor also amplifies the impact of the new regulation. The difference in the IRRs 
between the 20% increase and 20% reduction in the case of RD 661/2007 is less than 
6% (from 8.89 to 14.82), whereas this difference rises to 7.25% with the new regulation. 
 
4.2.3. Turnkey vs. reference plant. 
																																								 																				
10 Reference plant (not turnkey) without investment support post 2019. 
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The IRR of the plant is substantially reduced (about two percentage points for 
each scenario and case) when it is a turnkey plant. The reason is that it would be 13% 
more expensive. Therefore, this factor also amplifies the impact of the new regulation 
on the IRR of the plant since the difference in the IRR is 1.65% in RD 661/2007 (from 
9.14% to 10.79%)11. Turnkey plants were very common at the time in Spain, i.e. 
between September 2007 and September 2008, due to easy and cheap access to credit 
before the financial crisis. The fact banks were eager to lend and the very attractive 
economic conditions established in RD 661/2007 led to project developers being 
relatively unconcerned about the high costs of the initial investment. 
 
4.2.4. Continuation of support after 2019. 
 
After the loan for the initial investment is fully repaid after 2019, the support for 
investment (Rinv) established in the new regulation is assumed to be negligible, 
amounting to a small compensation for the purchase of the inverter. In the absence of 
investment support beyond 2020, the solar PV plants could still sell their electricity in 
the wholesale market, receiving the price in this market as revenue. They would also 
receive the support for O&M (𝑅!), which represents a modest amount.We have 
followed a conservative approach and have assumed that the wholesale electricityprice 
remains constant during the considered period12. The assumption of the removal of 
investment support can be justified because those plants subject to both RD 661/2007 
and RD 1578/2008 will have repaid most of their loans by then, since those loans were 
generally contracted on a 12-year period under project finance. Thus, the end of the debt 
for those plants will be an appropriate moment to suppress the investment support. 
However, in this article we have also calculated the IRR if such investment 
support was extended post-2020. This continuation could be justified by the government 
in order to offset the poor economic conditions of the solar PV plants, given their very 
small revenue flows (low wholesale price and low𝑅!), which leads to very low cash 
flows and, possibly, to the closure of many solar PV plants. Therefore, we have 
																																								 																				
11 It is assumed that the 100% is financed by a loan. 
12According to our calculations, the wholesale price should double since 2017 (from 0.053€/kWh to 0.106€/kWh) in 
order to obtain a 5% IRR. There would be two opposing influences on this price: the increase in fossil fuel prices and 
its reduction due to the merit order effect with increasing RES penetration levels. We assume that one offsets the 
other. 
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simulated what would be profitability of the firm if investment support continued after 
2019.In this case, the value for Rinv for the first six-year regulatory period (2014 to 
2019) would be 67,482€ (the amount set in EIT/1045/2014). For the second six-year 
regulatory period, we have used the value of 661000€/MW established in the report of 
Roland Berger for the Instituto para la Diversificación y el Ahorro de la Energía 
(IDAE)([27], p.154), which results in 65,657€ for our plant. This amount is maintained 
until the end of the remuneration period. The results in Table 4 and 5 show that the IRR 
would be much higher with the continuation of support, compared to a situation without 
investment support after 2020 (between 5 and 6 additional percentage points in the 
IRR). Notwithstanding the profitability levels associated to the conditions set up in RD 
661/2007 would not be attained even in this case. The calculations provided in this 
section represent the minimum and maximum values for the profitability of the plant. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
The new regulation on RES-E support has raised concerns about the impact of 
the retroactive changes on the profitability of existing solar PV plants. These concerns 
are related to the potential negative impact on the effectiveness of the scheme and, thus, 
on compliance with the RES Directive targets. 20% of gross energy consumption in 
Spain has to come from RES in 2020. Two recent reports from the European 
Commission [28]  and the European Environmental Agency [29] suggest that this is 
unlikely to be the case13. 
This paper has shown that, indeed, those concerns are justified. The new 
regulation has a considerable negative impact on the profitability of solar PV plants. 
However, the degree of reduction in profitability levels critically depends on several 
factors, assumptions and scenarios. Therefore, upper and lower bounds for profitability 
levels have been provided in this article. 
The cuts and retroactive changes are likely to have a highly detrimental effect on 
future deployment. On one hand, they will certainly increase the risk-premium 
associated to renewable energy investments in Spain, increase investor risks and reduce 
the attractiveness to invest in this country. These negative impacts on effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness in deployment (due to higher capital costs) should have been weighed 
																																								 																				
13 The analysis performed in European Commission (2015) shows that the expected RES deployment in 2020 will be 
several percentage points below the 2020 target. According to the European Environmental Agency (2014) In order 
to reach its 2020 target, Spain needs an average annual growth rate of 6.7% in the run-up to 2020. In absolute terms, 
this is equivalent to 2.1 times its cumulative effort so far, i.e., an ambitious task 
	 18	
with the reductions in the promotion costs paid by electricity consumers as a result of 
the new regulation. The project developers who invested in solar PV plants in the last 
years of the previous decade are highly frustrated. Lack of investor confidence will 
remain in the future. A possible way out of this situation might be to implement a new 
regulatory scheme which is based on the promotion of repowering of the existing solar 
PV plants, given that the costs of the modules has substantially been reduced in the last 
years. 
The analysis performed in this article suggests fruitful lines for future research. 
First, our data refer to a single solar PV plant and, thus, the results have to be taken with 
caution. Further research should replicate the analysis for plants with different features 
to the one considered in this paper. In addition, further research should be dedicated to 
the analysis of the impact of the new regulation on the costs of renewable energy 
promotion in general and solar PV support costs in particular. 
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2014	 4.667	 8.190	 61.238	 2761	 33.6	
2013	 4.662	 8.299	 61.181	 3267	 39.3	
2012	 4.534	 8.168	 60.065	 2877	 35.2	
2011	 4.243	 7.414	 57.889	 2665	 35.9	
2010	 3.838	 6.405	 55.034	 2897	 45.2	
2009	 3.398	 6.074	 52.119	 2868	 46.2	
2008	 3.398	 2.503	 51.310	 1155	 45.3	
2007	 690	 473	 20.284	 215	 43.3	
2006	 146	 99	 9.875	 45	 42.7	
2005	 47	 38	 5.391	 16	 39.9	
2004	 23	 17	 3.266	 6	 36.7	
Source: [18] [19]. 
 
Table 2. Cost concepts for the plant. 
Concept Value (€) 
% of total 
value 
Modules HIP 215 375,196 58.66 
2-axis tracking system DegertTraker 7000 NT  70,197 10.98 
Inverters (Sunny Central) 43,301 6.77 
Engineering project 2,534 0.40 
Assessment 1,150 0.18 
Civil works 14,957 2.34 
Installation works 52,576 8.22 
Electrical evacuation line (deep connection rule) 59,942 9.37 
Project direction 6,165 0.96 
Taxes and charges 675 0.11 
Financial expenditures 12,916 2.02 
Total     639,614 €  100.00 
 
Table 3. Cost of the inverters. 
€/W nominal 2007* 2014** 2018** 
100 kW 0.288 0.192 0.168 
500 kW 0.252 0.168 0.144 
1000 kW 0.264 0.156 0.132 
* Observed values 
** Estimated values 
 
Table 4.Impact of the new regulation on the profitability (IRR) of the plant (%). 
 Reference plant (100%) Turnkey plant 
80% 100% 
RD661/2007 11.32 10,29 9.14 
New regulation 3.28 1.23 0.31 
 
Table 5.Summary of profitability rates (IRR) under different assumptions and scenarios. 
 RD 661 Cost-containment  2010-2013 New regulation 2013 
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No investment support post 2019 Investment support post 2019 
With cost-cont. Cost-cont. 
&Turnkey 
With cost-cont. Cost-cont. 
&Turnkey 
With cost-cont. Cost-cont. 
&Turnkey 
Financedb
y a loan 
100% 10.79 (9.14 
turnkey) 
9.10 7.52 2.35 0.31 8.14 6.63 
80% 11.32 9.64 8.04 3.28 1.23 8.68 7.15 
60% 11.87 10.20 8.59 4.21 2.16 9.24 7.69 





Δ  20% 8.89 7.31 5.91 0.29 -1.49 6.45 5.11 
Δ  10% 10.01 8.38 6.89 1.66 -0.24 7.48 6.05 
∇10% 12.89 11.14 9.41 5.2 2.98 10.14 8.64 










































































Figure 3.Evolution of the IRR in the successive regulations. 
Note: “Cost-containment and beyond” includes the impact of the cost-containment measures 2010-2013 
plus the impact of the new regulation. 
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